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Professor Epstein claims to have undertaken serious criticism and re-
view of the American system of labor relations as it has been structured
by two pieces of New Deal era legislation, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the National Labor Relations Act.1 Such a work by a scholar of Epstein's
stature could be of great value to such diverse disciplines as law, econom-
ics, sociology, industrial relations, political science, and psychology. To be
worthy of its subject, such a study would involve an inquiry of tremen-
dous empirical scope and raise the most difficult of methodological
problems. How should one evaluate a process that has undergone incre-
mental but constant change over the past forty-five years? By what stan-
dards should the efficacy of current labor laws be judged? Are basic dem-
ocratic principles applicable to the workplace, and if so, to what extent
should workers be afforded a voice in "managerial" determinations?
Should models of worker participation in decisionmaking other than that
sanctioned by the National Labor Relations Act be permitted, and if so, of
what type?2 These are important, interesting and difficult questions. Pro-
fessor Epstein, however, avoids them entirely by a breathtakingly simple
device: He takes the "common law" (in its late nineteenth-century form)
as the appropriate "benchmark" against which to judge "modern statutory
schemes."' Thus, he never answers the questions a genuine critical evalu-
ation would have to address, i.e., how have the labor laws worked? Have
they helped or hindered American workers and the economy, and in what
ways? Have they promoted productivity and industrial peace? Are they
consistent with the democratic principles that form the framework of our
system of government? What conclusions can be drawn and applied from
the extensive transnational research that has already been conducted? In-
t William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School.
ft Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation,
92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983).
2. For two empirical studies of the effects of unionization, see R. FREEIAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT
DO UNIONS DO? (1984); S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1967). For an analysis of alternative schemes of worker participation
in management, see Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a) (2) (forthcoming).
3. Epstein, supra note 1, at 1359.
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stead, he comes to the not very remarkable conclusion that statutes avow-
edly designed to replace the common law, limit the market and do away
with the use of contract by employers as a device to prevent worker self-
organization are not consistent with the libertarian political theories, lais-
sez-faire economics, and common law doctrines concerning the employ-
ment relationship and property rights that they replaced. In short, Profes-
sor Epstein's work does not contribute in any way to our existing store of
knowledge about labor law. It sheds no light on the reality of labor rela-
tions, nor does it contribute anything to our understanding of the impact
of labor law on society. Given the antiquated nature of his methodology, it
is not surprising that Professor Epstein reiterates many of the same
propositions, syllogisms and rationalizations of those who opposed the en-
actment of the NLRA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place,
and without any newer evidence.4 As such, Professor Epstein's Article is
representative of a growing but lamentable tendency in the legal literature
to comment critically on areas in which the author has no expertise, using
as a measure axioms formulated in vacuo and without regard to observed
actualities.
Given his argument's anachronistic ring, it is interesting that Professor
Epstein claims to have analyzed his topic in light of "recent advances both
in general legal theory and in law and economics. ' Prominent among the
recent sources thus cited are several of his own earlier writings making
similar forays into other fields of law, or analyzing rights from a liber-
tarian perspective. His discussion of the common law governing the em-
ployment relationship relies heavily on English cases and commentaries
that are no more recent than the eighteenth and nineteenth century. There
is only one citation to modern industrial relations research and none to the
findings of labor economists. Similarly absent is any discussion of the ac-
4. See NATIONAL LAWYERS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE, REPORT ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1935). The noted labor historian,
Irving Bernstein, has written that
The du Ponts, with Sloan [Alfred P., Jr., the President of General Motors]. . .had been the
principal founders and bankrollers of the American Liberty League, the voice of political and
economic reaction in the mid-thirties. Its publications, "lavishly printed and widely circu-
lated," as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has written, "depicted the United States on the verge of
socialism, bankruptcy, and tyranny."
I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-1941, at 515
(1970).
Professor Epstein's precursors, however, are much older than the Liberty League. For example, in
1835, Dr. Andrew Ure condemned combinations of workers which he stated interfered with the free-
dom of workers to offer their services to employers. A. URE, PHILOSOPHY OF MANUFACTURERS
(London 1835). (Ure contended that organizations of workers were the product of agitators, who
incited workers to violence and crime). Ure was an early apologist for the conditions brought about by
industrialization. One of the goals of Ure's work was to demonstrate that child labor was not the cruel
and inhumane thing reformers argued it to be. See R. BENDIX, WORK AND AUTHORrrY IN INDUSTRY
89-91 (1956).
5. Epstein, supra note 1, at 1358.
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tual state of the common law at the time of the passage of the NLRA or
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or citation to empirical studies investigating
the impact of law on reality. Discussion of or reference to the work of
scholars in other disciplines concerning the impact of collective bargaining
and employee self-organization on society is also wanting. Indeed, Profes-
sor Epstein abjures the need to discuss reality at all and at base rests his
"investigation"' on contractarian notions of rights in a mythic world of
actors in the "original position" 7 (whose trades, evidently, are supposed to
bind us still).
It is not surprising that Professor Epstein would have us return to the
legal order for labor relations that existed a half-century and more ago
since he shares the values of those who established and maintained it.
What does surprise is his apparent belief that the common law ordering of
industrial relations was adequate at the time, or that it would prove effi-
cacious in any manner today.
Common law notions about the employment relationship grew out of
the law of domestic relations,8 and revealingly, leading commentators con-
tinued to treat the law governing employment relations (i.e., master and
servant) as a part of that field until the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury.9 Treatises on the law of domestic relations thus continued to be the
chief repository of commentary on employment law until well after the
century's turn. As late as 1889, for example, one leading treatise on do-
mestic relations law, in its treatment of the master-servant relationship
(which comprises roughly one-third of the treatise's content), defined ser-
vant as
persons commonly known in popular speech as workmen or employ-
ees. . . . In this class are included day laborers, factory operatives,
miners, colliers, and numerous others, of whom nothing more defi-
nite can be said than that they are hired to perform services of a
somewhat unambitious character.10
That modern forms of industrial organization had, by the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, long outstripped the almost feudal premises of a
6. Id. at 1358.
7. Id. at 1364.
8. In his analytic scheme of the common law, Blackstone grouped master and servant, husband
and wife, and parent and child under The Law of Persons, characterizing these as "[t]he three great
relations in private life." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410 (1979).
9. See, e.g., I. BROWNE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND OF EMPLOYER
AND EMPLOYED (2d ed. 1890); E. PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS OR DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1913); J.
SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING HUSBAND AND
WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND SERVANT (4th ed.
1889).
10. J. SCHOULER, supra note 9, at 691-92.
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personal and ongoing relationship between the employer and employee on
which the common law model rested was clear. The sudden appearance of
the employment-at-will doctrine in the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury reflected the legal response to the growth of industrialization. Previ-
ously, the common law of employment in England and the United States
had two well-established features: Employment was presumed to be for a
period certain, the length of which was fixed by custom, and the employ-
ment relationship was terminable only for "reasonable cause" and upon
the deliverance of customary and reasonable notice."" In contrast, the new
rule presumed that employment of no fixed duration was freely termina-
ble at the will of either party. The new rule's appearance, of course, was
concomitant with the phenomenal growth of the large industrial organiza-
tion which so affected and characterized this era.1" Unlike the small, own-
er-operated shops and factories it displaced, the new industrial organiza-
tion was not dependent on the skilled artisan for its successful and
continued existence. Mass production techniques increasingly made skills
obsolete and workers fungible. Industry now depended upon the availabil-
ity of a large pool of workers who could be hired and discharged accord-
ing to the demand for production. The at-will doctrine more accurately
mirrored and fit the needs and behavior of industry; hence, it quickly
came to replace the prior common law rules governing the employment
relationship.
The at-will doctrine thus began to shift employment law away from the
law of domestic relations and to shift the intellectual framework within
which the relationship was conceptualized from one based on a relation-
ship status to one structured by contract doctrine. Not surprisingly, this
change occurred at the height of the success of formalized notions of con-
tract in the courts, which ironically enough coincided with the beginnings
of public and legislative rejection of the premises of a laissez-faire market
society.3 These contract notions justified the at-will doctrine on the basis
11. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 148-49 (1981). Professor Glen-
don also observes that the law of France, Germany and Sweden during this period was similar. Id.
Blackstone notes that, unless otherwise agreed, a quarter's notice was required before discharging a
servant, and that a general hiring was presumed to be for the period of one year. I W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 8, at 413-14.
12. Some figures help remind one how great this growth was, and how fast it developed. For
example, from 252,000 in 1869, the number of manufacturing establishments in the U.S. increased to
512,000 in 1899; the number of factory wage earners from 2.1 to 5.3 million, and the value product of
manufacturers from $3.4 to $13.0 billion. M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOC-
RACY, 1865-1965, at 30-31 (1970).
13. See L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY
17-26 (1965); M. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 148-49; J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 71-78 (1975).
Interestingly, as Professor Glendon points out, the at-will doctrine "appeared almost simultane-
ously, as if written by an invisible hand, in the master-servant law of England, France, Germany,
Sweden and the United States." M. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 148. In the United States, the
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of mutuality, i.e., that workers were as free as employers to terminate the
relationship. 1' As one noted commentator has observed, this shift in the
conceptualization of the relationship exchanged "the older notions of pro-
tection and loyalty for a new legitimating fiction-freedom of contract."15
As is true of most common law doctrines in the process of evolution, how-
ever, the law governing the employment relationship continued to carry
with it some vestiges of the domestic relations concepts from which it had
grown. The most significant of these was the idea of a personal relation-
ship between the employer and employee. This notion was seized upon by
the courts as they tried to fit the employment relationship into the intellec-
tual framework that they had worked out for contract law over the pre-
ceding fifty or so years. The idea of a personal relationship was a handy
one, for it fit well the notions of bargaining, a meeting of the minds, and
voluntary association that the contractual elements of offer, acceptance
and assent encapsulate. Another notion that was carried over from the
domestic relations framework was the employee's duty of loyalty to the
employer. Significantly, however, the employer's reciprocal duty of protec-
tion that the law once imposed was lost in the process of the new rule's
evolution.16
It is important to remember in considering Professor Epstein's argu-
ments and the development of the common law ordering of the employ-
ment relationship that the most significant developments in the fields of
contract law and theory occurred during roughly the first half of the nine-
teenth century. As Lawrence Friedman has observed, as late as the publi-
cation of the Commentaries in the latter half of the eighteenth century,
Blackstone devoted but a few pages to contract law. In contrast, the law of
property occupied nearly an entire volume of the four-volume work.1 7
doctrine was initially announced by H.G. Wood in his treatise on Master-Servant Law, published in
1877. Significantly, this was the first treatise in the United States to be devoted entirely to the subject.
Wood noted in the Preface that the topic had previously been treated as part of domestic relations law.
Although Wood stated that in the U.S., the at-will rule was "inflexible" and universal, the cases he
cited are inapposite. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT §§ 134, 272
(1877). Nevertheless, Wood's rule was quickly accepted by the courts.
14. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) ("[T]he right of the employee to quit
the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such employ&").
15. M. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 150.
16. See id. at 143-50. There are many examples of the erosion of this duty, from the cessation of
a master's obligation to oversee the moral and physical well-being of his servants, to the growth of tort
doctrines such as assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule that had the effect of isolating em-
ployers from liability for workplace accidents. See Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV.
77, 83-84 (1961).
These developments were all part of a larger trend toward the formulation of new ideologies tai-
lored to fit the rise of industrialization and an entrepreneurial group. See R. BENDIX, supra note 4, at
73-117.
17. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 244 (1973); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
13, at 17-18.
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The growth of contract law was, of course, coeval with the disintegration
of a relationally ordered society and the appearance and growth of an
entrepreneurial, market-centered economy. Contract, unlike other devel-
oped areas of the law, such as property and domestic relations, provided a
ready vehicle for arranging private, impersonal market relationships. The
elements of contract theory-that parties are individual economic actors
who enjoy complete freedom of mobility and decision 1 -were congenial to
the people of an era who, as J. Willard Hurst has said, desired the legal
order to "protect and promote the release of individual creative energy to
the greatest extent compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity for
such expression." '19
The growth of large industrial and financial organizations in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, along with the appearance and growth of a
subsidiary rentier interest, reflected the substantial change in capital dis-
tribution that had occurred since the start of the century. "This distribu-
tion," Professor Hurst has observed, "concentrated unprecedented power
of decision in private hands, first in the railroads, then in heavy industry
and in investment banking houses and life insurance companies."20 Fur-
ther, the law's provision of "a range of flexible contract and association
devices, notably the corporation and the procedures of large-scale finance"
resulted in:
the enormous expansion of practical compulsion imposed on stran-
gers to contracts or associations, as commercial and industrial corpo-
rations and investment bankers reached out to occupy the multi-state
markets whose availability the law had guaranteed. Economic
growth tied the lives of an increasing proportion of people to the
market and the division of labor; they were either wage or salary
earners, or small producers or traders in specialized ranges of goods
or services. Theoretically buyers consent to the practical compulsions
of the market in which they buy; if they do not consent, they stay
out. But men who find their whole livelihood in the market are too
vulnerable to stay out.21
The upshot of these developments was a restriction of the breadth of prac-
tical choices and equality of opportunity that had once been available to
individuals. The resulting sense of personal helplessness and inability to
control events, Hurst observes, led to the preoccupation with methods to
redress the balance of power that so marked the last quarter of the cen-
18. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 21.
19. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 6.
20. Id. at 78.
21. Id. at 75.
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tury. The release of energy theme now came to be expressed through as-
sociations. The unprecedented formation of disciplined groups organized
around specific programs, such as the Farmers' Alliance, the Knights of
Labor, and the American Federation of Labor were part of this re-
sponse.22 Contract, which had earlier served as the vehicle for the release
of individual energy, proved "inherently too limited an institution to serve
this need" in a society increasingly dominated by large industrial and fi-
nancial organizations. 23
It was in this milieu that the "new" common law model of employment
was launched. With attributes from both domestic relations and contracts,
the model of the employment relationship was precariously and uncom-
fortably perched between two conceptual frameworks, both of which
themselves were becoming anachronistic. The general social and industrial
unrest, strikes, demonstrations calling for the legal recognition of workers'
rights to organize, and the rapid growth of unions and other organizations
devoted to furthering workers' interests that attended the last quarter of
the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth centuries were all
symptomatic of the incapacity of the common law to deal with patterns of
modern social organization. By the 1880's, the search for a new model by
which to order the employment relationship had become a societal preoc-
cupation and would remain one until the advent of the New Deal era.
Detailing the course of this search and the development of the various
schemes put forward as alternatives far exceeds the scope of this Com-
ment.24 It is sufficient for present purposes to note that by the end of the
nineteenth century, collective bargaining had surpassed contending models
such as producer cooperatives, utopian communities, "industrial partner-
ship plans" (based on various profit-sharing arrangements) and calls for
the reformation of government along socialist lines as the predominant
alternative scheme for the ordering of the employment relationship.
That the collective bargaining model prevailed over its rivals is
predominantly attributable to its congruence with the values and patterns
of life in American society. Unions were organized as a response to the
organization of capital and employers that had been made possible
through the pliable contract and association devices the law had devel-
22. Id. at 85. Other such groups mentioned by Professor Hurst include the Grange, the Grand
Army of the Republic, the American Woman Suffrage Association and the National Woman Suffrage
Association, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Anti-Saloon League, and the National
Civil Service Reform League. Trade associations and business lobby groups, Hurst notes, also took
more formal shape in these years. Among those formed during this period were the National Potters
Association, the Stove Founders National Defense Association, and the National Association of Man-
ufacturers. Id.
23. Id. at 75-76.
24. An admirable study of this search is contained in M. DERBER, supra note 12; see also Kohler,
supra note 2.
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oped. Like other program groups, the goal of unions was to redress an
imbalance of power; here, the imbalance that exists between an individual
employee and the entity for which he or she works. In this respect, unions
mirrored the industrial organizations that employed their members. As the
latter assembled to take advantage of the amplified power that the combi-
nation of capital and other resources provided, so workers sought, through
association, to obtain bargaining strength in settling the terms and condi-
tions of their employment. The idea of the collective agreement was also
consistent with the contract notions that had been developed over the
course of the century. The terms of the employment agreement would
continue to be privately set. Reflecting the reality of the time, however,
they would be set through negotiation between two organized entities, and
not between an individual and an organization (which, of course, usually
results in no bargaining whatever because the latter can most often state
the terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis). Further, unlike many of its rivals,
the collective bargaining model entailed no change in social structure. Un-
ions sought neither to reorganize the economy nor to displace management
in the operation of industry.2 5 As Mine Workers' president John Mitchell
stated in 1903, unionism "stands for the liberty of workingmen to arrange
their own lives and to contract jointly for the manner in which they shall
be spent in mine or factory."2 Unions, then, like the other program
groups that emerged contemporaneously with them, became the vehicles
through which, in Hurst's words, one would "mobilize group power in
behalf of individual status"27 in a society where, in the market and else-
where, power was increasingly passing away from individuals to
organizations.
The deficiency in the common law as it emerged was that it provided
the employer techniques for rejecting unions regardless of the wishes of
the employees. Under this system, an employer could discipline or black-
list union supporters, refuse to bargain without regard to employee senti-
25.
Collective bargaining in industry does not imply that wage earners shall assume control of
industry, or resonsibility for financial management. It proposes that the employees shall have
the right to organize and to deal with the employer through selected representatives as to
wages and working conditions.
Among the matters that properly come within the scope of collective bargaining are wages,
hours of labor, conditions and relations of employment, the sanitary conditions of the plant,
safety and comfort regulations and such other factors as would add to the health, safety and
comfort of the employees, resulting in the mutual advantage of both employers and employees.
But there is no belief held in the trades unions that its [sic] members shall control the plant or
usurp the rights of the owners.
S. GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE EMPLOYER 286 (1920), quoted in M. DERBER, supra note 12, at 127.
For a further elucidation of the role of unions as conceived of by the AFL, see Gompers, What I
Should Do If I Were An Employer, 27 AMERICAN FEDERATIONALIST 351 (1920).
26. J. MITCHELL, ORGANIZED LABOR (1903), quoted in M. DERBER, supra note 12, at 123-24.
27. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 86.
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ment, and obtain court injunctions against union organizing if some of his
employees were subject to yellow dog clauses. Much of Professor Epstein's
article is devoted to a defense of the yellow dog device. This defense is
supported in part by an indirect attack on unions and collective bargain-
ing, and in part by the contention that such contracts should be seen not
as employer coercion but rather as an expression of the employee's free-
dom of contract; a technique by which employees, for an economic pre-
mium, exchange their right to join a union. The latter argument ignores
the fact that if employees want to trade their right to bargain collectively
(and many do), they are in a much stronger position when they have a
legal right to secure union representation if they are dissatisfied with what
the employer has provided or what they believe the employer will provide.
As long as employees have the right to unionize, non-union employers are
motivated to pay union scale or above, and employees are in a position to
monitor the indirect promises which are a regular feature of union or-
ganizing campaigns. What the combination of the yellow dog device and
the injunction did was to make it possible for an employer to get the same
degree of assurance against unionization for little or nothing. Thus the
yellow dog device, like much of the common law scheme that Epstein
urges, makes good policy only if one is in favor of allowing employers the
legal option of operating on a non-union basis if they feel strongly enough
about it to either battle with or pay their employees a small premium for
the privilege. During the period in which employers had this choice they
exercised it so fiercely and were met by such determined extra-legal resis-
tance that almost no one was satisfied with the law to which Professor
Epstein would have us return.
Recognition among policymakers of the inadequacies of the common
law ordering of the employment relationship as it stood in the last quarter
of the nineteenth century was not long in coming. Within five years of the
end of the Civil War, both houses of Congress had established Committees
on Labor,28 and in 1878 the first full-scale congressional inquiry into la-
bor relations was undertaken through a Select Committee of the House.2"
Continuing unrest and disputes led to other inquiries by various House
and Senate committees,30 the creation of the Bureau of Labor (1884),1
28. The House Committee on Education and Labor was established in 1867; the Senate Commit-
tee on Education and Labor was established in 1870. U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, THE ANVIL AND THE
PLOW: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 275 (1963).
29. M. DERBER, supra note 12, at 83.
30. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON EXISTING LABOR PROBLEMS, INVESTIGATION OF LABOR
TROUBLES IN MISSOURI, ARKANSAS, KANSAS, TEXAS, AND ILLINOIS, H.R. Rep. No. 4174, 49th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1887); SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
THE SENATE UPON THE RELATIONS BETIVEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL AND TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE
COMMITTEE, 48th Cong. (1883).
31. Act of June 27, 1884, ch. 127, 23 Stat. 60. The Bureau was established as a division of the
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whose tasks included the collection of information about labor relations
and disputes, and the appointment by President Cleveland in 1894 of the
U.S. Strike Commission,"2 which was charged with investigating the
causes of, and formulating solutions to, labor relation problems on the
railroads. Interestingly, among other things, the Commission recom-
mended federal legislation to outlaw the yellow dog device (noting that
such legislation had already been enacted in several states) and it urged
employers to recognize the labor organizations to which their employees
belonged." The work and thoughts of these earlier bodies was capped by
the creation of the U.S. Industrial Commission in 1898.14 The Commis-
sion's eighteen members were jointly appointed by President McKinley
and Congress, and their investigation was the most extensive of any yet
conducted. The Commission heard testimony from nearly seven hundred
witnesses, and collected extensive documentary and statistical informa-
tion.35 It was assisted in its work by a large staff that included such noted
economists as John R. Commons. The Commission recommended the en-
actment and extension of a variety of legislative reforms that would pro-
mote the practice of collective bargaining. "[E]very facility," the Commis-
sion stated, "should be given labor to organize if it desires. . . ." The
chief advantage to be obtained from collective bargaining, the Committee
opined, was that through its practice, "each side obtains a better under-
standing of the actual state of the industry, of the conditions which con-
front the other side, and of the motives which influence it."'37 "Most
strikes and lockouts would not occur," stated the Committee, "if each
party understood exactly the position of the other."3 8 The Committee also
Department of the Interior; in 1888, legislation was passed that gave it independent status as the
Department of Labor. The Department was under the direction of a commissioner who lacked cabinet
status, but who reported directly to the President. Act of June 13, 1888, ch. 389, 25 Stat. 182. The
Department gained cabinet status with the enactment of the Sulzer bill in 1913, which President Taft
signed on his last day in office.
32. The Commission was appointed by President Cleveland as a result of the Pullman Strike of
1894, under authority of an Act permitting the President to appoint such a body for the purpose of
inquiring into and settling labor disputes on the railroads. Act of October 1, 1888, ch. 1063, § 6, 25
Stat. 501. For a brief description of the events surrounding Pullman, see P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 147-58 (1964). See also W. CARWARDINE, THE PULLMAN STRIKE (1894) (a
contemporary account); A. LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE (1942); THE PULLMAN BOYcOTT OF
1894: THE PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION (E. Warne ed. 1955).
33. UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE-JULY, 1894
LIV, S. EXEC. DOC. No. 7, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. (1895).
34. Act of June 18, 1898, ch. 466, 30 Stat. 476.
35. The testimony before, findings of, and special studies conducted by the Commission are con-
tained in nineteen volumes; the Commission pursued its work from 1898 to 1902.
36. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 5 REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON LABOR LEGIS.
LATION 8, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900).
37. U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 844, H.R.
DOC. NO. 380, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902).
38. Id.
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observed that bargaining would remove "the occasions of minor misunder-
standings" and would facilitate their correction. "A large proportion of
labor disputes," the Committee reminded, "originate in very unimportant
matters." "In the absence of the machinery and the attitude of peaceful
discussion," noted the Committee, "misunderstanding grows into bitter-
ness, and too often" a strike or lockout results.3 9 The third advantage bar-
gaining offered, stated the Committee, was that its successes were cumula-
tive. "The practice of meeting together," the Committee commented,
"constantly increased mutual understanding and mutual respect, between
employers and employees." 40 Fifteen years later, the members of the U.S.
Commission on Industrial Relations, who had been appointed by Con-
gress to study "the underlying causes of dissatisfaction in the industrial
situation," '41 again recommended extensive reformations of the law gov-
erning relations between workers and employers, and endorsed the con-
cept of collective bargaining.42
Significantly, participants in the search for a new model by which to
order the employment relationship were not limited to social reformers,
union activists, academics, and members of congressional panels, but in-
cluded management itself. Management's objectives in this endeavor were
twofold.43 The first was to discover new methods of group dealing that
would improve communication with employees, thereby reducing friction
between management and workers and in turn, securing both the willing
cooperation of the latter with management's directives and identity with
its goals. The second was to develop a model that could compete success-
fully with collective bargaining;44 ironically, after the turn of the century,
and into the 1920's, union membership continued to'grow despite the le-
gal obstacles placed in its way by the courts. 5 Tellingly, of the various
schemes with which management experimented, so-called employee repre-
sentation plans, or company unions, became the dominant employer alter-
native. As their sobriquet implies, these plans shared many similarities
with collective bargaining. They provided employees with a means of hav-
ing their voices heard concerning company policies and they often pro-
vided for grievance machinery, albeit of a much more limited scope than
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 351, 37 Stat. 415.
42. See U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1915).
43. For a study of the unfolding ideology of American management in this period, see R. BENDIX,
supra note 4, at 254-87.
44. Concerning the development of these alternative plans, see Kohler, supra note 2, and sources
cited therein.
45. In 1897 (at the close of a sharp depression) unions had under 500,000 members; by 1920,
over 5 million workers were union members. M. DERBER, supra note 12, at 173.
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that usually furnished through collective bargaining. The chief and crucial
difference between collective bargaining and the employers' alternative,
not surprisingly, was the degree of control the employer exercised over the
"representation plan" and the limitation of the plan's coverage to the
workers of one employer.46 For purposes of the present discussion, how-
ever, the key thing to be noticed is that management, like other sectors of
society, had increasingly found the common law ordering of the employ-
ment relationship unworkable and unsatisfactory and that, by the 1920's,
the leading substitute model that management had come to employ bore a
striking similarity to collective bargaining. Significantly, both the growth
in union membership and the use of "representation plans" occurred in
spite of the fact that management was legally protected from any duty to
bargain with employees or their bargaining representatives.
By the eve of the New Deal era, then, the model of the employment
relationship that the common law had devised nearly fifty years before
had become almost irrelevant. The actions and practices of both employees
and employers had grown around and over it, much as a tree surrounds
barbed wire stretched about its trunk. The model's chief use was to pro-
vide the courts with an intellectual framework for the denial of the associ-
ational rights to employees that the law had guaranteed to employers as a
fundamental right.
Not surprisingly, the common law of the employment relationship of
fifty years ago no more describes current management practices of large
businesses than it reflected those of the 1930's. Contemporary manage-
ment theory and practice emphasizes the involvement of workers in mana-
gerial decisionmaking. Like the pre-NLRA era, the management-oriented
alternatives to collective bargaining have adopted many of the latter's fea-
tures; their chief distinction, as in the past, lies in the control management
retains over participation schemes in an unorganized setting. More signifi-
cant, perhaps, is the fact that the common law governing the employment
relationship has itself undergone great changes over the last decade, and
bears only slight resemblance to the model for which Professor Epstein
longs. It now affords workers at least some of the substantive protection
once available only through self-organization, and the trend is decidedly in
the direction of broadening the protections of employees' interests in the
employment relationship. 47 Professor Epstein would reverse all of this de-
velopment without empirical investigation, and return to an order which
had largely been dismissed by all sides because that order conforms more
closely to his theoretical preferences.
46. A thorough study of various representation plans is contained in TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, INC., LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (1935). See also supra note 44.
47. See M. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 143-205.
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In light of this development, then, Professor Epstein's assertion that
"traditional common law principles provide a benchmark, both theoretical
and historical" against which to judge the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
National Labor Relations Act is a curious one. Common law rules, Black-
stone said, derive their weight and authority from their usage from a
"time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." '48 As the
foregoing discussion indicates, contrary to what Professor Epstein sug-
gests, the ordering of the employment relationship along the lines of con-
tractual theory is not practice "used time out of mind," but is instead a
fairly recent innovation. Until the late 1870's, employment was treated as
a status relationship, and, as Mary Ann Glendon has shown,49 the com-
mon law has since come full circle and is once again according to the
relationship many elements of a status. Hence, from an historical stand-
point, the common law ordering of employment of the late nineteenth cen-
tury can be regarded as a fairly short-lived anomaly rather than a long-
standing and tested method of ordering.
Professor Epstein, of course, has additionally asserted that the late
nineteenth century ordering of employment provides a proper theoretical
touchstone against which to judge "modern statutory schemes," because
they favor "limited government" and allow "the maximization of private
autonomy." These, too, are curious claims.
The reign of the common law model favored by Professor Epstein was
hardly one marked by a lack of governmental intervention, as names like
Coeur d'Alene, Pullman, and McKeesport recall. Further, the use of the
injunction as a device to break strikes, and after the Hitchman CoaP0
decision, as a tool to enforce yellow dog clauses entailed extensive involve-
ment of the judiciary in labor relations matters. In his well-known study,
The Government in Labor Disputes, Edwin Witte found that in the half-
century between 1880 and 1930, state and federal courts issued 1,845 in-
junctions on employer's applications in labor disputes.5 1 Interestingly,
Witte finds that prior to 1880, American courts issued no injunctions in
matters involving labor relations, but that the number of such orders in-
creased steadily with each decade thereafter.2 Thus, Witte's research re-
vealed the issuance of 28 such orders between 1880 and 1890. In contrast,
he found that 921 labor injunctions were granted in the decade
1920-1930.5S Of these injunctions, sixty were to enforce yellow dog agree-
48. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 67.
49. M. GLENDON, supra note 11.
50. For a meticulous dissection and criticism of the majority's opinion in the Hitchman decision,
see Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918).
51. E. WrrrE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 84 (1969).
52. Id. at 83-84.
53. As Professor Irving Bernstein has observed, this figure assumes "added meaning when viewed
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ments."' Indeed, the judiciary's involvement in labor matters through the
use of its equity powers became so extensive that calls for the limitation of
the courts' authority to issue injunctions in such disputes came not only
from labor and academics, but also from leaders of the bar and conserva-
tive political figures.55 Among such persons were S.S. Gregory, 8 a presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, and Senator George Wharton Pep-
per of Pennsylvania. 57 Much of these commentators' concern centered on
the proper role of the courts in such disputes, where the outcome could
largely depend on the decision of an unelected official. "Must we not,"
asked Pepper, "confine the courts to the sphere in which the creators of
our constitutional system intended them to live ... ?", Interestingly
then, the rise of court intervention parallels the growth of large industrial
organizations. As the common law model became more inadequate, the
resort to state intervention became more frequent.
It should be recalled in discussing nineteenth century notions of con-
tractual freedom that this method of public ordering places great state
power in private hands. The role of government in a regime of "freedom
of contract" is to enforce private agreements at the instance of a prom-
isee. 59 As Max Weber so early pointed out, the phrase "freedom of con-
tract," though evocative, is misleading to the extent that it suggests an
individual is free from domination by others. Its essential feature is not
that persons are left unregulated to make agreements as they please, but
rather, Weber observed, that their agreements will be enforced by the
state, in favor of the promisee.6" This method of ordering thus does more
than lend official backing to private transactions that have no necessary
against the fact that employers faced very few strikes" during this decade. I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN
YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933, at 200-01 (1960).
54. The latter figure, Witte points out, should not be undervalued. While injunctions to enforce
yellow dog contracts comprised "less than 10 percent of the total injunctions during this period,"
Witte notes:
several of these writs were taken out by a large number of employers acting jointly. These,
moreover, have been the most extensive of all injunctions in their provisions and remain in
effect so long as the complainants continue to use individual non-union agreements. [After the
Hitchman decision] [i]njunctions based on yellow-dog contracts now block all attempts to or-
ganize the coal miners throughout West Virginia; and there are a considerable number of
scattered mines and manufacturing plants elsewhere which are protected against efforts at
organization by injunctions issued some years since, now dormant, but likely to be revived
should organizers put in an appearance.
E. WITTE, supra note 51, at 224 (footnote omitted).
55. For an excellent summary of labors' treatment by the courts during the period 1920-33, see I.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 190-243.
56. See S. Gregory, Address of the President, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n, 37
REP. OF THE A.B.A. 255, 264-71 (1912).
57. Pepper, Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 44 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 174 (1924).
58. Id. at 179.
59. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 668-69 (1968); Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER
ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, at Ix-lxi (1954).
60. M. WEBER, supra note 59, at 99-100.
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connection with an individual's freedom from domination; it acts, as
Weber pointed out, to strengthen the positions of those who already have
economic power over others.61
The model for which Epstein argues, as history shows, brought about
the results Weber described. It did not, nor would it, afford in Hurst's
words, the "release of individual creative energy to the greatest extent
compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity for such expression. '62
Indeed, as we have seen, it was when financial and industrial organiza-
tions became so dominant that they restricted the equality of opportunity
available to individuals that program groups like unions began widespread
formation.
Professor Epstein tacitly admits that his model would yield the results
delineated by Weber."3 Hence, it is especially peculiar, given his goal of
61. Id. at 729-31. Thus, as Weber states:
The formal right of a worker to enter into any contract whatsoever with any employer whatso-
ever does not in practice represent for the employment seeker even the slightest freedom in the
determination of his own conditions of work, and it does not guarantee him any influence on
this process. It rather means, at least primarily, that the more powerful party in the market,
i.e., normally the employer, has the possibility to set the terms, to offer the job "take it or leave
it," and, given the normally more pressing economic need of the worker, to impose his terms
upon him. The result of contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the opening of the
opportunity to use, by the clever utilization of property ownership in the market, these re-
sources without legal restraints as a means for the achievement of power over others. The
parties interested in power in the market thus are also interested in such a legal order. Their
interest is served particularly by the establishment of "legal empowerment rules." This type of
rule does no more than create the framework for valid agreements which, under conditions of
formal freedom, are officially available to all. Actually, however, they are accessible only to the
owners of property and thus in effect support their very autonomy and power positions.
Id. at 729-30 (footnote omitted).
62. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 6.
63. Professor Epstein's only defense to this is an ipse dixit "[T]hat most contracts are for the
mutual benefit of both parties, regardless of their original endowments of wealth." Epstein, supra note
1, at 1360. Weber, however, pointed out that:
The increasing significance of freedom of contract and, particularly, of enabling laws which
leave everything to "free" agreement, implies a relative reduction of that kind of coercion
which results from the threat of mandatory and prohibitory norms. Formally it represents, of
course, a decrease of coercion. But it is also obvious how advantageous this state of affairs is to
those who are economically in the position to make use of the empowerments. The exact extent
to which the total amount of "freedom" within a given legal community is actually increased
depends entirely upon the concrete economic order and especially upon the property distribu-
tion. In no case can it be simply deduced from the content of the law . . . . [c]oerdon is
exercised to a considerable extent by the private owners of the means of production and acqui-
sition, to whom the law guarantees their property and whose power can thus manifest itself in
the competitive struggle of the market. In this type of coercion the statement "coactus
voluit' 8' applies with peculiar force just because of the careful avoidance of the use of author-
itarian forms. In the labor market, it is left to the "free" discretion of the parties to accept the
conditions imposed by those who are economically stronger by virtue of the legal guaranty of
their property.
185"Coactus voluit" (it is his wish, although coerced)-Romanist phrase to describe the situa-
tion of an individual who has engaged in a legal transaction under the influence of coercion, in
contrast to the situation in which a person is used as the mere physical tool of another, for
instance, where the latter forcibly grabs the former's hand and moves it so as to go through the
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maximizing personal autonomy, that he would put into employers' hands,
through the legalization of the yellow dog device, the power effectively to
determine whether employees should enjoy the same associational rights
the law affords employers. It is perhaps at this point that the degree of
state authority transferred to private hands under a "freedom of contract"
regime is made most clear.
The appearance and extent of power that would be held by large indus-
trial and financial organizations could hardly have been foreseen af the
time that liberal economic theories first developed. Yet, even in 1776,
Adam Smith observed that
We rarely hear . . . of the combinations of masters, though fre-
quently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this ac-
count, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of
the subject. Masters are always and every where in a sort of tacit,
but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of la-
bour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is every
where a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master
among his neighbors and equals.6
Smith noted, however, that when their employees organize themselves:
"The masters upon these occasions . . . never cease to call aloud for the
assistance of the civil magistrate, and the vigorous execution of those laws
which have been enacted with so much severity against the combinations
of servants, labourers, and journeymen.""6
In summary, if the maximization of personal autonomy is his goal, it is
difficult to perceive why Professor Epstein champions a return to the legal
order of more than a half-century ago. As Weber recognized, 6 such an
order does not lead to greater autonomy, but rather to an ever-increasing
restriction upon the freedom of individual action.67 This proclivity would
physical motions of writing a signature.
M. WEBER, supra note 59, at 730-31, 752.
64. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 75 (U.
of Chicago Press ed. 1976). Concerning the appropriation and "misuse" of Smith's thought by apolo-
gists for capitalism as it developed in the nineteenth century, see A. LINDEMANN, A HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN SOCIALISM 31-33 (1983).
It is interesting to compare the excerpt from Smith above with the following from the report of the
U.S. Strike Commission, supra note 33, at xlvii:
We also have employers who obstruct progress by perverting and misapplying the law of sup-
ply and demand, and who, while insisting upon individualism for workmen, demand that they
shall be let alone to combine as they please and that society and all its forces shall protect them
in their resulting contentions.
65. Id. at 75-76.
66. Weber's sudden and untimely death occurred in 1920. The first portions of Economy and
Society appeared in 1921.
67. As Weber stated:
The private enterprise system transforms into objects of "labor market transactions" even those
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be exacerbated by the re-legalization of the yellow dog device. It, of
course, amplifies and cements the economic power enjoyed by employers
under a "freedom of contract" regime by ensuring that employees will be
able to combine their resources only upon the former's sufferance. 68 In
effect, the yellow dog device allows employers to sit on both sides of the
table, by permitting them largely to determine and regulate the strength of
employees' bargaining power. Reduced to its basics, Professor Epstein's
model ensures that the more powerful party in the market will dictate the
terms of employment, and that that party will be the employer.
Unfortunately, Professor Epstein leaves unexamined and apparently
unappreciated the essence of collective bargaining: its function as a
method through which employees and employers jointly establish a com-
prehensive scheme of industrial self-government.69 In David Feller's
words, collective bargaining provides:
a system of law to govern matters much more important to the em-
ployee than those governed by most public law: his right to a job and
to a promotion, the hours at which and the conditions under which
he is required to work, his right to refuse or to share in the opportu-
nity to work overtime, the length and scheduling of his vacations,
and so forth.70
personal and authoritarian-hierarchical relations which actually exist in the capitalistic enter-
prise. While the authoritarian relationships are thus drained of all normal sentimental content,
authoritarian constraint not only continues but, at least under certain circumstances, even in-
creases. The more comprehensive the realm of structures whose existence depends in a specific
way on "discipline," that of capitalist commercial establishments, the more relentlessly can
authoritarian constraint be exercised within them, and the smaller will be the circle of those in
whose hands the power to use this type of constraint is concentrated and who also hold the
power to have such authority guaranteed to them by the legal order.
M. WEBER, supra note 59, at 731.
68. Professor Epstein's arguments would appear to permit employers nearly boundless ability to
control the associational ties that their employees might form. For example, it appears that an em-
ployer could lawfully require, as a condition of employment, that an applicant agree to abjure certain
religious practices or refrain from joining or assisting a given (or all) political parties. Like the choice
between assenting to a yellow dog clause or remaining unemployed, under Professor Epstein's prem-
ises, one cannot argue that these choices are illusory because of economic inequality between the
parties. Assuming that there is no use or threat of force involved, the only objection that can be
interposed to the legal system's recognition of the validity of these clauses is that the applicant has a
precontractual right to demand both political party membership and employment, or a precontractual
right to engage in certain religious practices and employment. Assuming that the employer in question
is a private person or entity, with no relation to the state, such rights would seem to exist only if, like
the right to one's own person, they are recognized as being basic and inalienable. Significantly, no less
a moral authority than the Pope, JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS (ON HUMAN WORK) § 20, at
48-49 (1981) and no less a political authority than President Reagan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, at
16, col. 1 (address in reaction to the banning of Solidarity by the Polish government on October 9,
1982) have proclaimed that union membership is such a right.
69. The Supreme Court recognized this key aspect of collective bargaining in its landmark opin-
ion in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960) ("A collective
bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government." Consequently,
stated the Court, the agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code . . . ." Id. at 578).
70. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 761
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The duty to bargain affords employees the opportunity to participate in
the framing and administration of the terms and rules that govern the
worker-employer relationship.7' This modification of the character of
rulemaking and administration in the workplace from a unilateral and
authoritarian process to one of bilateral consultation is the gist of collec-
tive bargaining as established by the National Labor Relations Act.72 It is
this-the sharing of power-that underlies much of the resistance to the
idea of collective bargaining, and to the Act itself.
Contrary to the impression that one might receive from Professor Ep-
stein's description, a central principle of the American model of collective
bargaining is the exclusion of government from the parties' relationship. A
noteworthy feature of the framework the Act establishes for the creation
of this private system of law, and one that distinguishes the practice of
collective bargaining in the United States from that in other nations, is the
concept of free collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Act
neither regulates the relationship of the parties once collective bargaining
begins, nor specifies any of the substantive terms that must become part of
the agreement; in fact, it does not even require that an agreement be
rdached.7 ' As the Court has said, "Congress intended that the parties
should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any gov-
ernmental power to regulate the substantive solution of their differ-
ences."7  The making of this private law to govern the workplace thus
goes forward in private, its provisions not subject to governmental over-
sight. Consistent with their private character, the overwhelming majority
of collective bargaining agreements also provide for a private dispute-
resolution system, arbitration to settle disagreements about the interpreta-
tion and application of these "codes."17 5
There are other misperceptions about the effects of unionization and
bargaining that one may carry away from Professor Epstein's piece.
Among these are the notions that unionized establishments are less pro-
ductive7" than non-unionized firms and that unions increase wage ine-
(1973).
71. For an elucidation of this view, see id. at 720-24.
72. As Professor Feller observes, "The agreement reached as a result of this bargaining becomes
the rule governing the stated portion of the enterprise. It is not an agreement on the terms on which
union members will work but an agreement on the rules which management will observe with respect
to all employees." Id. at 736. For a brief explication of the incentives management has to accept
unions, see id. at 761-71.
73. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960); NLRB v. Amer-
ican Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
74. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 488.
75. Over 95% of collective bargaining agreements contain provision for arbitration. U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor Bull. No. 1425-6, Arbitration Procedures (1966).
76. See R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 1, at 21-22, 162-80.
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quality.77 As the latest empirical research demonstrates, these (and a
number of other widely held beliefs about the effects of unions) are not
true.78 This is not to suggest that the authors believe that the Wagner Act
was a piece of statutory drafting without peer, or that every aspect of
unionization is an unalloyed good. It is to suggest that the Norris-
LaGuardia and Wagner Acts, by affording employees the associational
rights enjoyed by employers, and the opportunity to participate in setting
and administering the terms under which they work, do much to increase
individual freedom and decrease authoritarian constraint.7 9 They do so
not only in the workplace, but in the political realm as well, through en-
suring that employees are free to join groups that can represent their in-
terests in an organized way, just as corporations and business lobbies rep-
resent entrepreneurs.
The fact that unions and other mediating groups do not exist or are
highly controlled in totalitarian systems of both the right and left is not
coincidental. As Derek Bok and John Dunlop point out, unions make an
important contribution to the democratic process in a society dominated by
large organizations through providing "a coordinated and coherent politi-
cal voice to workers who would otherwise be largely disorganized," and
by increasing "the political participation of poorer segments of soci-
ety. .. ."80 In contemplating Professor Epstein's arguments, one does
well to regard the outcomes his suggested scheme encourages, and to recall
Justice Holmes' acute observation that it is considerations of social advan-
tage, not logic, that determine the configurations of one's legal
arguments.81
As Archibald Cox has observed, 2 one of the principal things labor
asked of the law was the unfettered right to form, join and assist unions.
It is this right that the Norris-LaGuardia Act removed from private deter-
mination, through outlawing the yellow dog device. It is this right of free
association that the National Labor Relations Act affirmatively guarantees
77. See id. at 20, 78-93. Professors Freeman and Medoff observe that the claim that unions
increase wage inequality:
is wrong not because the effect to which it directs attention-raising wages of some workers at
the expense of other workers-does not occur. It does. The claim is wrong because the increase
in inequality induced by monopoly wage effects is dwarfed by three other trade union effects
on wages that reduce inequality: union wage policies lower inequality of wages within estab-
lishments; union wage policies favor equal pay for equal work across establishments; and
union wage gains for blue-collar labor reduce inequality between white-collar and blue-collar
workers.
Id. at 78.
78. See id; S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 1.
79. See supra note 67.
80. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 425 (1970). Concerning the
strength of unions' political power, see R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 2, at 191-206.
81. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. A. COX, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 2 (1960).
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employees, and which is the Act's cornerstone. This right is one for which
blood has been shed and lives placed in jeopardy here and elsewhere. To
even suggest removing it on the basis of the sort of argument put forth by
Professor Epstein is an affront to all those who struggled to make it a
reality.
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